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SUPREME COURT REVIEW
stances surrounding a search are no longer neces-
sary to justify the warrantless search of an auto-
mobile.4'
While Chambers may appear to be a questionable
decision when viewed from a position subscribing
to the absolute dictates of the fourth amendment,4'
it is significant to note that an almost unanimous
Court found the search justifiable under the rea-
sonability approach.4 Mr. Justice Harlan, dis-
senting in part, retained the absolute approach:
"The Court's endorsement of a warrantless in-
924 (7th Cir. 1960); People v. McGhee, 35 Ill. 2d 302,
220 N.E. 2d 205 (1966); Wilson v. State, 2 Md. App.
210, 233 A.2d 817 (1967).
4, Compare United States v. Barton, 282 F.Supp.
785, 788 (D. Mass 1967), where the court held that
"there was no immediacy about the situation which
would have prevented the police from obtaining a
search warrant" with Sisk v. Lane, 219 F.Supp. 507
(N.D. Ind. 1963), where the lapse of time was justified
on the ground that the officers felt that the suspect
must be taken to the police station immediately.42 See Justice Jackson's observation in Johnson v.
United States, 333 U.S. 10, 14 (1947):
"When the right of privacy must reasonably yield
to the right of search is, as a rule, to be decided by
a judicial officer, not by a policeman or Govern-
ment enforcement agent."
Cf. Aguilar v. Texas, 378 U.S. 108 (1964)43Mr. Justice Stewart, concurring, reiterated his
view that fourth amendment issues should not be
susceptible to collateral attack. Compare Kaufman v.
United States, 394 U.S. 217, 242 (1969) (dissenting
opinion) with Note, Wax Fruit. The Cognizability of
Fourth Amendment Claims in Collateral Attacks Upon
Convictions, 61 J. Cix L. C. & P.S. 51 (1970).
vasion of privacy where another course would
suffice is simply inconsistent with our repeated
stress on the Fourth Amendment's mandate of
'adherence to the judicial process'." 4
The decisions which have echoed Justice Har-
lan's philosophy have apparently been emasculated
by the decision in Chambers.
4"
The rationalization of the two ostensibly con-
radictory positions taken by the Court in Vale and
Chambers depends on the object being searched.
The sanctity of the home demands that police ob-
tain a warrant before conducting a search unless
the prosecution can prove that exceptional circum-
stances justified dispensing with the warrant. How-
ever, the eyes of the fourth amendment may blink
at a warrantless search of an automobile if the
police act within the elusive bounds of reasonabil-
ity.
44399 U.S. at 64 (Harlan, J., concurring and dis-
senting).
45 The following cases have held a warrantless search
of an auto at the police station after the occupants of
the auto have been arrested as violative of the fourth
amendment: Wood v. Crouse, 417 F.2d 394 (8th Cir.
1969); United States v. Harvey, 397 F.2d 526 (7th Cir.
1968); Collins v. United States, 289 F.2d 129 (5th Cir.
1961); Petty v. State, 241 Ark. 911, 411 S.W. 2d 6
(1967); Eyrich v. People, 423 F.2d 582 (Colo. 1967);
People v. Gates, 35 IIl. 2d 584, 221 N.E. 2d 285 (1966);
Coston v. State, 252 Miss. 257, 172 So. 2d 764 (1965);
People v. Beamon, 44 Misc. 2d 336, 253 N.Y.S. 2d 674
(1964); State v. Bernius, 177 Ohio St. 155, 203 N.E.
2d 241 (1964).
DOUBLE JEOPARDY
Ashe v. Swenson, 397 U.S. 436 (1970)
The recent Supreme Court decision in Ashe v.
Swenson' expanded the fifth amendment protec-
tion against double jeopardy afforded defendants
in criminal trials. The Court held that the col-
lateral estoppel doctrine,2 which bars re-litiga-
1397 U.S. 436 (1970).
2 Collateral estoppel is defined in the RESTATErNT
Or JUODGMENTS, section 68 (1942):
Where a question of fact essential to the judgment
is actually litigated and determined by a valid and
final judgment, the determination is conclusive be-
tween the parties in a subsequent action on a dif-
ferent cause of action....
In United States v. Kramer, 289 F.2d 909, 913 (2d Cir.
1961), the Court dealt with the manner in which col-
lateral estoppel is applied:
Application of the principle inevitably has two
phases. The first is to determine what the first judg-
ment determined, a process in which, as the Sealfon
tion of issues already decided in a case, was in-
corporated in the fifth amendment's protection
against double jeopardy.3 The decision represented
case makes plain, the court must look not simply
to the pleadings but to the record in the prior trial.
The second is to examine how that determination
bears on the second case.
3 397 U.S. at 445. The Supreme Court and federal
courts have often applied collateral estoppel, sometimes
referring to it as res judicata, in federal criminal cases.
The leading case is United States v. Oppenheimer,
242 U.S. 85 (1916). In Oppenheimer, defendant was
charged with conspiracy to conceal assets from a
trustee in bankruptcy. His defense was that the issue
in the conspiracy case had already been litigated, while
the government contended that res judicata was not
available to defendants in criminal trials. justice
Holmes made it clear that res judicata was available
and he concluded that the fifth amendment applied
not only by its terms, but it also included at least the
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a departure from the Court's position in Hoag
v. New Jersey,4 a case factually similar to Ashe,
where it had expressed "grave doubts whether
collateral estoppel can be regarded as a constitu-
tional requirement." I
The Ashe case arose when six men, playing a
friendly game of poker in the basement of a house,
were surprised and robbed by three or four masked
gunmen.8 One of the robbers was allegedly Ashe,
the petitioner in this case. Following his arrest,
Ashe was charged with six separate counts of rob-
bery but was first brought to trial on a charge of
robbing only one of the poker players. At the trial,
the state introduced evidence establishing the com-
plainant's loss of money,7 and also called the
robbery victims as witnesses to identify Ashe.
The victims' testimony, however, did not clearly
indicate the number of robbers nor did it posi-
tively identify Ashe as one of them.' After the trial
court instructed the jury that theft of "any money"
would sustain a conviction and that Ashe could be
found guilty even if he had not personally taken
the complainant's money, the jury found Ashe
"not guilty due to insufficient evidence." I
Six weeks later, Ashe was tried for the robbery of
another of the poker players. At the second trial,
he was convicted and sentenced to 35 years in
prison. The difference in result in the two trials
apparently stemmed from stronger testimony of-
fered at the second trial on the issue of Ashe's
identity as one of the robbers' 0 Although it is
basic civil law principle of res judicala. In Sealfon v.
United States, 332 U.S. 575 (1948), the Court found
that issues resolved at the first trial could not be re-
litigated at the second and reversed petitioner's
conviction. In Cosgrove v. United States, 224 F.2d
146, 155 (9th Cir. 1955), the court cited Sealfon as con-
trolling. The Court in Emich Motors Corp. v. General
Motors Corp., 340 U.S. 558, 568-69, noted that col-
lateral estoppel was an established criminal law prin-
ciple, then permitted plaintiff to introduce at the second
trial those issues necessarily determined in the first.
In the conspiracy trial in United States v. DeAngelo,
138 F.2d 466 (3d Cir. 1943), the government was barred
from re-litigating those issues already decided in a
previous trial. Similarly, the court in United States v.
Kramer, 289 F.2d 909 (2d Cir. 1961), held that the
issue decided in defendant's favor at his robbery trial
precluded the government from seeking to prove the
same issue at a conspiracy trial.
4 356 U.S. 464 (1958).
5Id.
6 367 U.S. at 437.
7397 U.S. at 438; State v. Johnson, 347 S.W.2d 220,
221 (Mo. 1961).
8 397 U.S. at 438.
9 Id. at 439.
10 Id. at 440. Regarding the existence of stronger
testimony on the identity issue at the second trial, the
Court said:
true that the robbery victims testified at both
trials and that the prosecution in both cases showed
that the robbers took money and valuables from
each complainant, the witnesses in the second trial
were better able to identify Ashe as the robber n
The Supreme Court of Missouri subsequently
affirmed Ashe's conviction, denying his contention
that the constitutional prohibition against double
jeopardy prohibited the second trial' 2 The Mis-
souri court found that in cases involving the rob-
bery of numerous victims, nothing prevented the
state from framing the same number of indictments
as victims. 3 The court reasoned that the robbery
of each person is a separate offense and, as a result,
separate trials for each of these offenses technically
does not violate the prohibition against double
jeopardy.
4
In his appeal to the Missouri Supreme Court,
Ashe also maintained that his second trial was pro-
hibited because the first jury had already deter-
mined that he was not one of the robbers, and that
therefore, under the doctrine of collateral estoppel,
the court was prevented from further considera-
tion of the issue 5 The Missouri court, however,
dismissed this argument by challenging both its
premise and the policy urged on its behalf. The
petitioner had argued that the jury acquitted him
only because they believed that he was not one of
the robbers. This assumed that the state proved
all elements of its case except the identity issue,
and therefore, that the basis for the verdict was the
lack of proof as to identity. The court rejected
this premise, however, and suggested an alterna-
tive ground; namely, that the jury may have ac-
quitted Ashe because it did not believe any prop-
The witnesses were for the most part the same,
though this time their testimony was substantially
stronger on the issue of petitioner's identity. For
example, two witnesses who at the first trial had
been wholly unable to identify the petitioner as one
of the robbers, now testified that his features, size,
and mannerisms matched those of one of their as-
sailants. Another witness who before had identified
the petitioner only by his size and actions now also
remembered him by the unusual sound of his voice.
The State further refined its case at the second
trial by declining to call one of the participants in
the poker game whose identification testimony at
the first trial had been conspicuously negative. The
case went to the jury on instructions virtually
identical to those given at the first trial. 397 U.S.
at 439-40.
nId.
" State v. Ashe, 350 S.W.2d 768 (Mo. 1961); State v.
Ashe, 403 S.W.2d 589 (Mo. 1966).





erty had been stolen.' 6 Second, the court rejected
Ashe's argument that application of the collateral
estoppel doctrine was necessary to protect de-
fendants from prosecutorial harassment through
multiple trials 7 The court was confident that
"the prosecutors will not resort unfairly to multi-
ple indictments and successive trials in order to
accomplish indirectly that which the constitu-
tional interdiction precludes." 18
In the United State District Court,19 Ashe again
raised double jeopardy and collateral estoppel
arguments. The district court, however, rejected
both arguments, relying on the United States
Supreme Court decision in Hoag v. New Jersey.
0
The Hoag case was factually similar to Ashe, each
involving the alleged robbery of several victims
followed by an acquittal at the first trial and a
conviction at the second. In Hoag, which was de-
cided before the Supreme Court held in Benton v.
Maryland that the double jeopardy provision of the
fifth amendment applied to the states,2' the Court
considered the objections to a second trial within
the context of due process. Under that approach,
multiple prosecutions were considered unconsti-
tutional only if so frequent as to violate the "funda-
mental fairness" required by the due process pro-
vision of the fourteenth amendment.2 2 The Court
found no violation of due process because the state
had not attempted to wear out the accused with
numberous prosecutions.2 The Hoag Court also
16 Id. The Missouri Supreme Court refers to State v.
Johnson, 347 S.W.2d 220 (Mo. 1961) as setting forth a
detailed statement of facts. That account indicates
that uncontroverted evidence was introduced to prove
money was stolen from Knight. 347 S.W.2d at 221. The
Supreme Court in Asie termed the evidence "unas-
sailable" that property had been taken from Knight.
397 U.S. at 438.
17 Id. at 770, 771.
1 Id. at 771.
19 Ashe v. Swenson, 289 F.Supp. 871 (W.D. Mo.
1967).
20 Id. at 873. In Hoag v. New Jersey, 356 U.S. 464
(1958), the petitioner, Hoag, was originally tried for
the robbery of three men. The three men were robbed,
as were others, while visiting a bar. After Hoag was
acquitted at the first trial, he was again indicted, this
time on a charge of robbing a fourth victim in the same
bar. A jury found Hoag guilty at his second trial.
21 Benton v. Maryland, 395 U.S. 784 (1969).
2" In Hoag, the Court relied on the "fundamental
fairness" test to determine whether a given course of
prosecutions had violated due process. In approving
two prosecutions where Hoag had allegedly robbed
several persons in a bar, the Court could not say that
more than one prosecution would always be unfair,
nor could any formula be used to determine whether
multiple trials violated the constitutional guarantee.
356 U.S. at 467-469.
2356 U.S. at 467.
dismissed petitioner's collateral estoppel argument
by simply failing to reach the issue. Instead, the
Court accepted a New Jersey state court ruling
which held that collateral estoppel was not avail-
able to Hoag because it was impossible to know
upon which issue the jury's verdict was based.
4
On appeal to the United States Court of Ap-
peals," Ashe's robbery conviction was again af-
firmed. Subsequently, the United States Supreme
Court granted certiorari26 and reversed Ashe's
conviction.'7 The Court's opinion stressed the
importance of Benton v. Maryland, s in which the
Court had held the fifth amendment applicable to
the states through the fourteenth amendment.
The Court noted that because of Benton, the col-
lateral estoppel issue had been transformed:
The question is no longer whether collateral estop-
pel is a requirement of due process, but whether it is
a part of the Fifth Amendment's guarantee against
double jeopardy.
29
The Court then traced the background of collateral
estoppel and found it to be "an established rule of
federal criminal law." ' 0 Further, the Court found
that if the federal rule of collateral estoppel were
applied to Aske, the second prosecution in that
case would be barred." The Court then addressed
itself to its earlier question of whether this es-
tablished rule of federal law was embodied in the
fifth amendment guarantee against double jeop-
ardy.3' After concluding that it was, the Court
accordingly found Ashe's second trial constitu-
tionally impermissible.
The reasoning of the majority opinion in Ashe
is presented in two parts. The Court first stated
its reliance on Benton, then welded an established
rule of federal criminal law, namely collateral
estoppel, onto the structure provided by the fifth
amendment. Were it not for the addition of the
2' Id. The Court deferred to the state court's resolu-
tion of the collateral estoppel issue, and added its
"grave doubts" that collateral estoppel could be re-
garded as a constitutional requirement. 356 U.S. at 471.
26 Ashe v. Swenson, 399 F.2d 40 (8th Cir. 1968).
26 393 U.S. 1115 (1969).
27 397 U.S. at 437. Ashe was a 7-1 decision with Jus-
tice Stewart writing the Court's opinion. Justices Black
and Harlan concurred in separate opinions, and justice
Brennan also concurred in an opinion joined by Justices
Douglas and Marshall. Chief Justice Burger wrote the
lone dissenting opinion.
28395 U.S. 784 (1969).
29 397 U.S. 442.
10 Id. at 443.




collateral estoppel rule to the fifth amendment, the
Court would have been unable to reach its double
jeopardy finding in Ashe. That is because by itself
the fifth amendment prohibits multiple prosecu-
tions for the "same offense," 31 and the meaning of
"same offense" has traditionally been interpreted
by the "same evidence" test. Under the "same
evidence" test, if a second charge is hypothetically
provable by evidence different from that submitted
at the first trial, the defendant is not placed in
double jeopardy.u Applying the "same evidence"
test to the facts of the Ashe case, the second charge
involved different evidence than the first with
regard to stolen property, thereby constituting a
separate offense. Therefore, as it is usually in-
terpreted, the fifth amendment's double jeopardy
clause would not prevent Ashe's second trial.
Given the limited scope of protection afforded
the defendant by the "same evidence" test and the
need to conform with the spirit of the double
jeopardy clause, the Court faced two choices.
Either it could discard the "same evidence" test
in favor of a test that would more effectively main-
tain the double jeopardy protection, or it could
retain the test but with the addition of the collat-
eral estoppel rule. In adopting the latter approach,
the Court relied heavily upon its observance that
collateral estoppel was a firmly established prin-
ciple of federal criminal law. 5
justice Brennan, however, who wrote a con-
curring opinion, would have taken the other al-
ternative available to the Court and discarded the
"same evidence" test in favor of the "same transac-
n The relevant section of the Fifth Amendment pro-
vides "nor shall any person be subject for the same of-
fense to be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb ...."
11 Kirchheimer, The Act, Offense and Double Jeopardy,
58 YAr L. J. 513, 515 (1949). The original formula-
tion of the same evidence rule appeared in Rex v.
Vandercomb & Abbott, 2 Leach 708, 720, 168 Eng.
Rep. 455, 461 (1796):
Unless the first indictment was such as the prisoner
might have been convicted upon the proof of the
facts contained in the second indictment, an ac-
quittal on the first indictment can be no bar to the
second.
The dissenting opinion in Ashe stated the same evidence
test used by the Court in Blockburger v. United States,
284 U.S. 299, 304 (1932):
IT]he test to be applied to determine whether there
are two offenses or only one is whether each provi-
sion requires proof of a fact which the other does
not.
For the criticisms of the same evidence test, see Jones,
What Constitutes Double Jeopardy?, 38 J. CRMn. L.C. &
P.S. 379 (1947); Case Comment, 43 No= DAix
LAwYFR 1017 (1968).
207 U.S. at 443-45.
tion" test." Under the "same transaction" test,
all charges arising from a single criminal transac-
tion would have to be joined at one trial.87 Applying
the test to the situation in Ashe, all of the six
possible indictments against Ashe would have had
to be disposed of at the first trial. Hence, under
the "same transaction" test, the second prosecu-
tion of Ashe would have been barred.
Justice Brennan supported his suggested ap-
proach by noting that the modern legislative
tendency to increase the number of statutory
offenses enables imaginative prosecutors to bring
many charges for a single criminal act.us He argued
that the "same transaction" test would lessen the
chances of a vexatious succession of trials, while at
the same time decreasing the burden on over-
crowded courts. 9
Another argument for the same transaction test
is that it will encourage well-prepared prosecu-
tions.4 Prior to Ashe, a prosecutor could afford to
try a case without maximum preparation and
care, knowing full well that if he lost, he could,
under the same evidence test, try the case again on
another charge. This was particularly true in cases
involving uncertain witnesses. For example, in
Ashe the prosecution discovered that one witness
performed poorly on the stand and, accordingly,
he was not called to testify at the second trial.a
Under the "same transaction" test, the prosecution
would be unable to refine its case through numer-
ous trials, and therefore would be required to give
special attention to the first trial.
Brennan, however, did not consider the various
arguments forwarded in opposition to the "same
36 Id. at 453-54.
3 Id.
Is Id. at 452. One commentator has noted the same
historical trend:
The doctrine of collateral estoppel was historically
of little significance in the criminal law, probably
because of the scarcity, until about a century ago,
of situations ripe for its application.... In the last
century, however, the tendency among scholars
and legislators to favor specificity in the drafting
of statutory offenses-a tendency which no doubt
originated from a desired to protect defendants-
made it possible for a single act or a group of acts
with a common motivation to constitute multiple
statutory violations.
Mayers and Yarbrough, Bis Vexari: New Trials and
Successive Prosecutions, 74 HAav. L. Rnv. 1, 29
(1960).
319 Id. at 454.
40 This additional argument in favor of the same
transaction test is mentioned in Mayers and Yarbrough,
Bis Vexari: New Trials and Successive Prosecutions, 74




transaction" test.4 One such objection relates to
the inability of the state to appeal from a verdict
for the defendant. 48 The argument is that since the
state cannot appeal from even a clearly erroneous
jury verdict, it should not be compelled to join
all of its charges at one trial and thereby risk an
acquittal on every charge." To allow the state to
appeal criminal verdicts, however, would itself
diminish the area of protection extended by the
double jeopardy clause.41 Chief Justice Burger
raised an additional argument in opposition to the
"same transaction" test in his dissent in Ashe.46
In his view of the Ashe case, there was not a single
robbery, but rather six robberies of six separate
individuals. He argued that this "personal view" of
criminal conduct is inconsistent with a require-
ment that several offenses be joined together for
trial as if they were one transaction.47 He raised
the important point that the "same transaction"
test would apply to situations in which the "sepa-
rateness" of the crimes would be more apparent
than in the Ashe situation, which involved the
robbery of several persons in one place. For ex-
ample, the Chief Justice pointed out that in cases
involving serious crimes such as murder,
unless all the crimes are joined in one trial the al-
leged killers cannot be tried for more than one
of the killings even if the evidence is that they
personally killed two, three, or more of the vic-
rim3.48
In his dissent, Chief Justice Burger also criti-
cized what he interpreted as a move by the Court
"to superimpose on the same-evidence test a new
and novel collateral estoppel gloss." 41 The dissent
characterized collateral estoppel as a civil law
42 For discussions of proposals to meet objections to
the "same transaction" test, see Kirchheimer, The Act,
Offense and Double Jeopardy, 58 YALE L. J. 513, 534
(1949); Jones, Wha Constitutes Double Jeopardy? 38
J. Canm. L.C. & P.S. 379, 387 (1947).43 This argument is suggested in Jones, What Consti-
tutes Double Jeopardy?, 38 J. Cans. L.C. & P.S. 379,
390 (1947).44 The same argument is made in Mayers and Yar-
brough, Bis Vexari: New Trials and Successive .Prosecu-
tions, 74 HAxv. L. Rtv. 1, 37 (1960), but the argu-
ment is promptly rejected:
On the other hand, the policies of conservation of
judicial energy and public funds and of protection
against harassment should be determinative.4
5 See Case Comment, 44 No= DA1 LAWyE 293,
295 (1968).
46 397 U.S. at 468-69.
47 1d. at 469.
Is Id. at 464.49
Id.
doctrine with limited applicability in the criminal
law context. 0 The Chief Justice noted that for two
centuries the courts had failed to include collateral
estoppel as an "ingredient" of the fifth amend-
ment. Hence, he did not believe that it was the
province of the Court to make any change at this
time.51
The Chief Justice was concerned with the con-
stitutional aspects of the Court's decision and also
questioned whether the majority had correctly
analyzed the jury verdict. By applying its self-
labeled approach of "realism and rationality," 2 the
Court had determined that there was only one
disputed issue for the jury at Ashe's trial:
The single rationally conceivable issue in dispute
before the jury was whether the petitioner had
been one of the robbers.2
In dismissing the Court's analysis as mere
"guesswork," 6 the Chief Justice set up an alterna-
tive theory to explain the jury verdict. He sug-
gested that the jury may have been confused as to
Ashe's location in the house at the time of the
robbery, particularly, whether he was in the base-
ment or upstairs. Second, he theorized that if such
confusion existed, the jurors could have misunder-
stood the court's instruction and found Ashe not
guilty simply because they believed he had not
participated in the actual taking, when all that
was required to convict was a common intent
among the robbers. 55
The first problem with the Chief Justice's theory
is that it cannot be reconciled with the statement
of facts offered by the Missouri Supreme Court,
which clearly indicates that Ashe was in the base-
ment during the robbery.56 Therefore, a rational
60 d.
51 1d. at 466-67.52 Id. at 444. Regarding its rational approach, the
Court stated:
The federal decisions have made clear that the rule
of collateral estoppel in criminal cases is not to be
applied with the hypertechnical and archaic ap-
proach of a 19th century pleading book, but with
realism and rationality. Where a previous judg-
ment of acquittal was based upon a general verdict,
as is usually the case, this approach requires a
court to 'examine the record of a prior proceeding,
taking into account the pleadings, evidence, charge
and other relevant matter, and conclude whether
a rational jury could have grounded its verdict
upon an issue other than that which the defendant
seeks to foreclose from consideration.'
31 Id. at 445.
54 Id. at 468.
1
5 Id. at 467.
Is 350 S.W.2d at 769. The court cites a more detailed
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jury would not be confused on that point. Second,
the theory assumes that the jury misconstrued an
instruction which dearly authorized a guilty
verdict simply upon a finding of common intent
among the robbers. 7 The Chief Justice's analysis,
in contrast to the Court's, rests upon the hypothe-
sis that the jury acted irrationally and chose an
unlikely ground for its verdict,' The criticism of
his approach is that it makes impossible any find-
ings as to what a general jury verdict determined,
even in relatively simple cases involving a single
contested issue. And without any conclusions as
to what the jury verdict determined, the collateral
estoppel doctrine cannot apply.
The Ashe holding, in which the collateral estop-
pel rule becomes a constitutional requirement,
adds breadth to the fifth amendment protection
extended to criminal defendants in state trials.
Specifically, it frees the defendant from the burden
of re-litigating issues already decided in his favor
at a trial. It should be noted, too, that Ashe is only
one of two recent Supreme Court decisions which
have significantly expanded the protection afforded
statement of facts in State v. Johnson, 347 S.W.2d 220
(1961). That account reads in part:
[One of Ashe's] companions first went to Mrs.
Gladson's bedroom, awakened her, tied her with a
telephone cord, and took her ring. In the mean-
time, the three other men [including Ashe] entered
the basement. 347 S.W.2d at 221.
5 The instruction appears in the majority opinion,
397 U.S. at 439:
The Court instructs the jury that all persons
are equally guilty who act together with a common
intent in the commission of a crime, and a crime so
committed by two or more persons jointly is the
act of all and of each one so acting.
The Court instructs the jury that when two
or more persons knowingly act together in the
commission of an unlawful act or purpose, then
whatever either does in furtherance of such unlaw-
ful act or purpose is in law the act and deed of
each of such persons.
58The argument was presented to the Court in
Sealfon that there were a number of possibilities as to
what the jury might have thought, or perhaps the
jury compromised or decided wrongly. The Court
dismissed this argument, noting: "The instructions
under which the verdict was rendered, however, must
be set in a practical frame and viewed with an eye to
all the circumstances of the proceedings." 332 U.S.
at 575.
One commentator has observed that there must be
a presumption of jury rationality before any conclu-
sions as to its verdict can be reached:
For before it can be argued that a court should
search the record of a previous trial to determine
what specific issues were decided by a general ver-
dict, it must be presumed that juries base verdicts
upon logical inferences drawn solely from the evi-
dence in the record. Comment, Collateral Estoppel
in Criminal Cases, 28 U. Cur. L. REv. 142, 146
(1960).
by the fifth amendment's protection against double
jeopardy. In Waller v. Florida,9 the Court ruled
that the double jeopardy provision will be violated
when an accused is tried on the same charge in both
a state and municipal court."0 Hence, as in Aske,
the Court significantly reduced the instances in
which government might circumvent the letter
and spirit of the fifth amendment by reprosecuting
a defendant.61
The Court's holding in Aske, however, will have
limited applicability. Collateral estoppel will only
be available to the defendant who has once been
acquitted on a charge, but then faces a second
trial on another charge involving the same issue or
issues already decided. For example, if Ashe had
been convicted instead of acquitted at his first
trial, collateral estoppel would have provided no
protection if, for reasons such as dissatisfaction
with the length of his sentence, the state decided
to prosecute him on the other robbery charges. 2
Further, if the trial or review court is simply un-
able to reach a conclusion as to what issues the
acquittal verdict determined, then the collateral
estoppel rule will not apply." The most important
effect of the Asks decision may be to encourage
59397 U.S. 387 (1970). The decision was announed
on the same day as Ash.
60 The court rejected the state's argument that the
double prosecutions were permissible under the dual
sovereignity rationale of Bartkus v. Illinois, 359 U.S.
121 (1959).
6' The state still has the ability to circumvent the
double jeopardy protection where the defendant's act
violates both state and federal statutes. Bartkus v.
Illinois, 359 U.S. 121 (1959). See Comment, Double
Prosecution by State and Federal Governments: Another
Exercise in Federalism, 80 HARv. L. R.v. 1538 (1967).
6 However, collateral estoppel may apply in the
case where defendant is found guilty. See Emich
Motors Corp. v. General Motors Corp., where at a second
trial, plaintiffs were allowed "to introduce the prior
judgment to establish prima fade all matters of fact and
law necessarily decided by the conviction .... " 558
U.S. at 569. Also, there is a possibility that collateral
estoppel can be utilized by a defendant found guilty
of a crime:
Although the doctrine of collateral estoppel is ap-
plicable in a criminal case regardless of whether
the defendant was found guilty or innocent, the
doctrine will not avail the defendant if he is found
guilty unless the former conviction was based
upon facts which negative the possibility of guilt
in the second prosecution. United States v. J. R.
Watkins Co., 127 F.Supp. 97,103 (D. Minn. 1954).
It should also be noted that the "same transaction"
test would prohibit successive prosecutions in the Ashe
case even if he had been convicted at the first trial.
13 Justice Brennan's concurring opinion described
Ashe as "fortunate" because there is some doubt that
collateral estoppel would have been available if the




prosecutors to combine charges in cases involving
several offenses arising from a single transaction.
If charges are tried singly, the risk taken by the
prosecution is that collateral estoppel will apply to
prevent further trials. This tendency to join
charges would promote the policy behind a "same
transaction" test, principally the elimination of a
harassing series of trials," while leaving the prose-
cution enough flexibility to try charges either
singly or all at once.65
Because it occupies a middle ground between
the "same transaction" and "same evidence" tests,
collateral estoppel does not completely relieve
defendants from the strictures of the "same evi-
dence" test. The concurring opinions, however,
add a hopeful note in that some Justices are pre-
pared to shed the "same evidence" test in favor of
64397 U.S. at 454.
65 Chief justice Burger's dissent argues against the
"same transaction" test that it would leave prosecutors
inflexible and unable to try multiple crimes in some
circumstances. 397 U.S. at 468-469.
the "same transaction" test. At best, the con-
curring opinions will urge the Court to thoroughly
reappraise the validity of the interpretation usually
given to the constitutional phrase, "same offense."
Finally, the vitality of the collateral estoppel
doctrine will depend on the approach taken by the
courts in analyzing jury verdicts. In adopting the
approach of "realism and rationality," the Su-
preme Court carefully examined Ashe's trial
record, considered evidence and jury instructions,
and then isolated the only issue in dispute. The
danger is that review courts may effectively
eliminate the protection of collateral estoppel by
assuming that juries are irrational, and therefore
capable of deciding cases in opposition to, not in
accord with, the weight of the evidence. Unless
the courts adopt the same approach utilized by the
Supreme Court in the delicate job of analyzing the
meaning of jury verdicts, the collateral estoppel
doctrine will remain as little more than an aca-
demic curiosity.
Price v. Georgia, 398 U.S. 323 (1970)
In Price v. Georgia,1 the Supreme Court held that
after a successful appeal, the fifth amendment
precluded retrial of a defendant for murder if that
defendant was convicted of the lesser included
offense of manslaughter at the first trial. In ar-
riving at this decision, Chief Justice Burger,
writing for the majority, relied on the historical
foundation for the double jeopardy prohibition,3
1398 U.S. 393 (1970).
2 U.S. CoNsr. amend. V states (in part):
* nor shall any person be subject for the same
offense to be twice put in jeopardy of life orlimb ..
'The prohibition against placing a person in double
jeopardy for any one crime emanated from the common
law. In Green v. United States, 355 U.S. 184, 187 (1957),
the Court cited Blackstone:
The constitutional prohibition against "double
jeopardy" was designed to protect an individual
om being subjected to the hazards of trial and
possible conviction more than once for an alleged
offense. In his Commentaries, Blackstone recorded:
... the plea of auterfoits acquit, or a former acquit-
tal, is grounded on this universal maxim of the
common law of England, that no man is to be
brought into jeopardy of his life more than once for
the same offense.
But the Anglo-American legal tradition is not
unique in its prohibition of double jeopardy. The
Spanish also prohibited a retrial of a defendant for
the same offense.
After a man, accused of a crime, has been ac-
quitted by the court, no one can afterwards accuse
but was forced to overrule several past decisions in
his attempt to raise the status which the double
jeopardy prohibition should occupy in our legal
system.
The defendant in Price was tried for murder.
The jury returned a verdict of guilty to the lesser
crime of voluntary manslaughter. It made no
reference in the verdict to its resolution of the
murder charge. After a successful appeal, 4 the
defendant was reindicted for murder. Price con-
tended5 that this second trial for murder placed
him in double jeopardy in light of his first con-
viction on the lesser charge of manslaughter and
therefore should be barred by the fifth amend-
ment. The trial judge rejected this contention and
the jury in this second trial rendered another
verdict of voluntary manslaughter.
Price then made a direct post-conviction appeal6
him of the same offense, (except in certain specified
cases). FuEto REAL, lib. iv, tit. xxi. 1, 13 (1255).
4 Price v. State, 108 Ga. App. 581, 133 S.E. 2d 916
(1963).
5 See note 3 supra. Price pleaded the writ of auterfoits
acquit, or former acquittal.
6The Georgia Constitution operates to provide
direct review by the Georgia Supreme Court of all cases
which require construction of either the Constitution
of the United States or the Constitution of Georgia.
GA. CoNsT. art VI, §2(4).
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to the Georgia Supreme Court. That court trans-
ferred the case7 to the Georgia Court of Appeals
which, relying on Brantley v. State,8 rejected the
appeal.9 After the Georgia Supreme Court denied
certiorari, the petitioner sought review in the
United States Supreme Court. Certiorari was
granted "0 to consider the issue of whether a state
has the power
to retry an accused for murder after an earlier guilty
verdict on the lesser included offense of voluntary
manslaughter had been set aside because of trial
error n
Chief justice Burger, choosing among seemingly
contradictory precedents, analyzed the issue posed
by Price in a manner which accentuated the un-
derlying rationale for the double jeopardy prohibi-
tion. He emphasized that the prohibition against
double jeopardy embodied in the fifth amend-
ment 12 prohibited not only double punishment,
but went further to prohibit a defendant from
twice being put on trial for the same offense1
justice Black, writing for the Court in Green v.
United States" explained this concept.
The underlying idea, one that is deeply ingrained
in at least the Anglo-American system of juris-
prudence, is that the State with all its resources
and power should not be allowed to make repeated
attempts to convict an individual for an alleged
offense, thereby subjecting him to embarrassment,
expense, and ordeal and compelling him to live in a
continuing state of anxiety and insecurity, as well as
enhancing the possibility that even though innocent, he
may be found guilty. (emphasis added)' 5
However, the prohibition against double jeop-
ardy does not go so far as to insulate a defendant
from retrial on the same charge if he has, since his
conviction on that charge, pursued a successful
7Price v. State, 224 Ga. 306, 161 S.E.2d 825 (1968).
8 132 Ga. 573, 64 S.E. 676 (1909), affid, 217 U.S. 284.
9 Price v. State, 118 Ga. App. 207, 163 S.E.2d 243
(1968).
10 395 U.S. 975 (1969).
n398 U.S. 324 (1970).
" See note 2 supra.
1Chief justice Burger states, 398 U.S. 324, 326
(1970):
The 'twice put in jeopardy' language of the Con-
stitution thus relates to a potential, i.e., the risk
that an accused for a second time will be convicted
of the 'same offense' for which he was initially
tried.
14 355 U.S. 184 (1957).
15 Id. at 188. See also United States v. Ball, 163 U.S.
662, 669 (1896), and Ex Pare Lange, 85 U.S. (18 Wall.)
163, 169 (1873), in which the Court stated:
appeal' The courts have sanctioned a second
trial in these instances under the doctrine of con-
tinuing jeopardy. 7 In Ball v. United States,8 how-
ever, the Court held that a finding of acquittal,
even if based on a defective indictment which
may be appealed to reverse the convictions of co-
defendants, could not be reviewed without putting
the defendant into jeopardy a second time,
thereby violating his constitutional rights. There-
fore, the Court rejected the idea that the doctrine
of continuing jeopardy could be used to avoid the
prohibition against double jeopardy.
The concept of continuing jeopardy received
an exhaustive analysis by the Supreme Court in
two cases arising in the Philippines during the
period of U.S. ownership by virtue of the American
victory in the Spanish-American War. These
cases were Kepner v. United States"9 and Trono v.
United States.21 In Kepner, an attorney in Manila
was accused of embezzling the funds of his client.
Although the defendant was acquitted at trial, the
government appealed and won a reversal. A second
trial resulted in a conviction, but Kepner appealed,
contending that he had twice been placed in
jeopardy. After disposing of two preliminary con-
siderations-jurisdiction and the applicability of
the U.S. Constitution (especially the Bill of Rights)
The common law not only prohibited a second
punishment for the same offense, but went further
and forbid a second trial for the same offense,
whether the accused suffered punishment or not,
and whether in the former trial he had been ac-
quitted or convicted.
11 Even in Price v. Georgia, the Court states, 398
U.S. at 326-27(1970).
Petitioner sought and obtained the reversal of
initial conviction for voluntary manslaughter by
taking an appeal. Accordingly, no aspect of the bar
on double jeopardy prevented his retrial for the
crime.
17 Courts have upheld the constitutionality of retrial
after appeal. As Justice Black points out in Green v.
United States, 355 U.S. 184, 189 (1957):
Most courts regarded the new trial as a second
jeopardy but justified this on the ground that the
appellant had "waived" his plea of former jeopardy
by asking that the conviction be set aside. Other
courts viewed the second trial as continuing the
same jeopardy which had attached at the first
trial by reasoning that jeopardy did not come to
an end until the accused was acquitted or his con-
viction became final. But whatever the rationaliza-
tion, this Court has also held that a defendant
can be tried a second time for an offense when his
prior conviction for the same offense had been set
aside on appeal.
is 163 U.S. 662 (1896). See also United States v.
Sanges, 144 U.S. 310 (1892).
19 195 U.S. 100 (1904).
20 199 U.S. 521 (1905).
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to the PhilippinesS--the Court reached the issue
of double jeopardy. Following Ball, it resolved
this issue in favor of the defendant-petitioner.
The Court rejected the contention in Holmes'
dissent 2 that continuing jeopardy would forestall
the application of the principle of double jeopardy
until all appeals and retrials had been completed
on all charges. Holmes stated,
It is more pertinent to observe that it seems to me
that logically and rationally a man cannot be said
to be more than once in jeopardy in the same
cause, however often he may be tried. The jeop-
ardy is one continuing jeopardy from its beginning
to the end of the cause. Everybody agrees that
the principle in its origin was a rule forbidding a
trial in a new and independent case where a man
already had been tried once. But there is no rule
that a man may not be tried twice in the same
case.u
Continuing, Holmes rejected the contention that
a successful appeal by the government and a
subsequent retrial would result in double jeopardy.
In his view a man is not in jeopardy in a case of
misdirection, whether he appeals or the govern-
ment appeals, because, "... there can be but one
jeopardy in one case," 2 and a second trial is
merely a continuation of the jeopardy posed in the
first.2 1
A year after Kepner was decided, the Trono26 case
came before the Court. Dealing with a fact situa-
tion which Holmes, in his Kepner dissent, found
did not constitute an example of double jeopardy,
a fact situation analogous to that presented in
2 1The Court had some difficulty in finding that the
provisions of the United States Constitution applied
to the Philippines. In a confused manner the Court first
found that the American predecessor in ownership of
the islands, the Spanish, also held double jeopardy
violated their law. Then the Court stated that Spanish
law was not applicable and the Philippineswould be sub-
ject to the provisions of the United States Constitu-
tion, which also prohibited double jeopardy. Kepner v.
United States, 195 U.S. 100, 120-123 (1904).
22195 U.S. at 134--37 (Holmes, J., dissenting).
2 Id. at 134.24 Id. at 136.
251d. at 135-36.
It might be said that when the prisoner takes
exceptions he only is trying to get rid of a jeopardy
that already exists-that so far as the verdict is in
his favor, as when he is found guilty of man-
slaughter upon an indictment for murder, ac-
cording to some decisions, he will keep it and can
be retried only for the less offense, so that the
jeopardy is only continued to the extent that it
has already been determined against him, and is
continued with a chance of escape. I believe these
decisions... to be wrong.
26 See note 20 supra.
Price, the Court apparently reversed Kepner and
affirmed the right of the government to retry the
defendant on a more serious charge than the one
on which he was convicted and from which he had
appealed. In Trono the defendants, though charged
with murder, were convicted of assault. That
conviction was appealed and overturned by the
Philippine Supreme Court. That court then found
the defendants guilty of murder and increased
their sentences. The United States Supreme Court
affirmed in a decision marked by the failure of a
majority of the Court to agree upon any opinion.
Four justices took the approach that an appeal of
the assault conviction constituted a waiver of the
double jeopardy claim against the murder charge.
Holmes concurred in the result, and although he
wrote no opinion, its seems probable that he would
have found the waiver theory too narrow and
would have preferred his definition of continuing
jeopardy forwarded in his Kepner dissent. Four
justices dissented in Trono.28 Two of them, Mc-
Kenna and White had only one year earlier con-
curred with Holmes' dissent in KePner.29 These
dissenters found that Trono's claim was valid under
the fifth amendment and that it constituted suffi-
cient grounds for reversal of the case in favor of
the petitioner.
Burger found himself unable to accept the
Holmes theory of continuing jeopardy. He relied
on Green v. United States0 to solve the problem of
conflicting precedents.posed by Kepner and Trono
since it appeared that they could not be distin-
guished on their facts. As Burger stated in Price,
"... there is no relevant distinction between
this case [Price] and Green v. United States." 3 1
Green presented a situtation in which the peti-
tioner had been tried and convicted of first degree
murder. This occurred after an earlier guilty
verdict on the lesser included offense of second
degree murder had been set aside on appeal. The
government in Green argued that a successful
appeal of a conviction on a lesser included charge
- 199 U.S. 521, 535 (1905).
28 The justices' rationale for this divergence was that
Kepner was not overruled by Trono, was not distin-
guishable from it, and should therefore be followed.
Thus they conformed to stare decisis. White and
McKenna saw no distinction, as the other justices did,
in the rationale that the two cases differ because in
one, Kepner, the government appealed, and in the
other, the defendant appealed. To them, the decision
in Trono obstructed the right of appeal. 199 U.S. at 537.
29 195 U.S. 100, 134 (1904).
30 Green v. United States, 355 U.S. 184 (1957).
1 Price v. Georgia, 398 U.S. 323, 329 (1970).
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constituted a waiver of the defendant's constitu-
tional defense of double jeopardy. Black, writing
for the 5 to 4 majority, denied the efficacy of this
argument, and implicitly overruled Trno.2 He so
ruled on two grounds. First, he deemed the waiver
theory a "paradoxical contention" because a
waiver must be voluntary to be constitutionally
permissible. To attach a waiver theory to the
constitutional right of appeal, he argued, leaves
the convicted defendant no meaningful choice."
If he appeals, he waives his fifth amendment right
against double jeopardy. If he does not appeal, he
retains his right, but it is of little comfort since he
has given up a possible chance to have his con-
viction overturned.
Second, Black advanced a theory which appears
to be as much of a legal fiction as the waiver theory
he discredited. He argued that the jury finding
that the defendant was guilty of the lesser charge
constituted an affirmative finding that he was not
guilty of the greater offense.
When given the choice between finding him guilty
of either first or second degree murder it [the jury]
chose the latter ... Therefore it seems clear, un-
der established principles of former jeopardy,
that Green's jeopardy for first degree murder came
to an end when the jury was discharged so that he
could not be retried for the offense."
Frankfurter, in his dissent, 5 attacked the apparent
fiction developed by Black.
Surely the silence of the jury is not, contrary to the
Court's suggestion, to be interpreted as an express
finding that the defendant is not guilty of the
greater offense. All that can with confidence be
said is that the jury was in fact silent. 8
Ignoring the logic of Frankfurter's strong dissent
"Green v. United States, 355 U.S. 184, 197 (1957).
"Even Justice Holmes observed this fact in Kepner
v. United States, 195 U.S. at 135 (dissenting opinion):
Usually no such waiver is expressed or thought of.
Moreover, it cannot be imagined that the law
would deny to a prisioner the correction of a fatal
error, unless he should waive other rights so im-
portant as to be saved by an express clause in the
Constitution of the United States.
In Green v. United States, 355 U.S. 184, 193 (1957),
the Court calls this argument of waiver, and act of
"barter" and states: "the law should not and in our
judgement does not, place the defendant in such an
incredible dilemma."
" Green v. United States, 355 U.S. 184, 190-91
(1957). Cf. Wade v. Hunter, 336 U.S. 684 (1949).
25355 U.S. 184, 198 (dissenting opinion). In his dis-
sent, Mr. Justice Frankfurter was joined by Justices
Burton, Clark and Harlan.
3" Id. at 214.
and accepting Black's theories of implicit acquittal
and jury determination, Burger concluded that
the case against Price should be reversed. How-
ever, he faced one more problem case, that of
Brantley v. State,7 relied on by the Georgia courts
to affirm the trial court decision in Price. The fact
situation in Brantley is analogous to that in Price,
except that the defendant was convicted of murder
on retrial." Burger contended that Green overruled
Brantley, and that Brantley was no longer viable.
He reasoned:
In Palko v. Connecticut 9 this Court refused to over-
turn a first degree murder conviction obtained after
the State had successfully appealed from a convic-
tion of second-degree murder which was the product
of a trial on first-degree murder charges. The Court
ruled that federal double jeopardy standards were
not applicable to the States.
Palko was overruled by Bent= v. Maryland,'0
where this Court determined that the double jeop-
ardy prohibition of the Fifth Amendment should be
applied to the States.... Brantley and Palko were
of the same genre, and Brantley necessarily shared
Palko's fate in Bento."
The Court also felt compelled in Price to combat
the argument of the State of Georgia that, since
Price was convicted of manslaughter in both trials,
the claim of double jeopardy constituted harmless
error. Burger held that the outcome of the second
trial was irrelevant. The mere fact that such a trial
commenced was prohibited by the fifth amend-
ment.
The Double Jeopardy Clause, as we have noted, is
cast in terms of the risk or hazard of conviction,
not of the ultimate legal consequences of the ver-
dict.4
In Burger's view, the jury, confronted by the
choice of convicting the defendant of murder or
manslaughter, may have found him guilty of the
lesser charge rather than prolong their debate on
his true innocence or guilt." This compromise
17 See note 8 supra.
28 The factual context of Green v. United States,
355 U.S. 184 (1957) and Brantley v. State, 132 Ga. 573,
64 S.E. 676 (1909), aff'd, 217 U.S. 284 (1910), are iden-
tical. It appears that the Georgia courts followed their
own state decisions rather than resort to those of the
federal courts. See notes 37 and 38 infra and accom-
panying text.
9 302 U.S. 319 (1937).
40 395 U.S. 784 (1969).
41398 U.S. at 330-31 n. 9.
42398 U.S. at 331.
42 The acceptance of Black's logic in Green v. United
i9701
